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Cooperation in rebuilding Afghanistan, in bringing stability and a measure of improvement for the people of that devastated land, lies in thinking big on a small stage. Recovery (of Afghanistan) lies in helping the provinces, province by province. 1 Alvin Z. Rubinstein
Afghanistan has the dubious distinction of being the largest opium-producing country in the world. According to a report in the Los Angeles Times, "It regained its position last year with a yield of 3,750 metric tons, and production is expected to be as high this year, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reports. Seventy-five percent of the world's heroin, which is "Agriculture was the foundation of the of the economy not only because of its large contribution to GDP and national employment but also because it provided many of the materials upon which much of the country's industry and trade depended. Cotton was the critical raw material for the textile industries and a valuable export; wool was the main input for the important carpet industry and was also an important export commodity. Cottonseed was the key input for the extraction, refining, and soap industries. The sugar beet crop was refined domestically, and there was also fruit and nut processing and packaging for export. Hides and skins were key inputs for much of the local handicrafts industry and were also major export Fertilizer use increased from 9,000 tons in 1967 to over 100,000 tons in 1978. In the 1960s the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) began a program that was designed to raise wheat output through higher yielding varieties so that wheat output would rise enough to achieve basic self-sufficiency. New varieties of rice, sugarcane, sugar beets, and cotton were also introduced into the country. Average yields rose during the decade before the PDPA coup." 6 The moderately successful agriculture programs showed that with outside assistance, Afghanistan could develop along modern expectations. "After the PDPA came to power, the Afghan government claimed that by 1984 farm output was near or at all-time highs for output of cereals, vegetables, and fruits. Overall, the government boasted that the level of total agricultural output was more than 15 percent greater than the levels of the mid-1970s." 7 Between 1979 and 1988, when the Soviet Army invaded and occupied Afghanistan, "the Afghan government and the Soviets pursued a 'scorched earth' strategy in an effort to curb armed resistance activities in the countryside. This activity seriously disrupted the rural economy in many regions. In the wake of government attacks and mass reprisals, entire regions that were once fertile became areas of barren waste. Various tactics were employed to spread terror and to destroy both food sources and means of food production. Even more serious for the longer term prospects were the attacks against the agricultural infrastructure. In many areas the local irrigation system had less capacity as a result of bombing attacks and the reduced levels of maintenance. Dams had not been rebuilt after the spring runoffs, and water canals filled with sand and mud. In Qandahar, for instance, many of the fruit orchards were dying for lack of water. These orchards would take years to replace." This is the backdrop against which Afghanistan's national economic condition and any potential policy solutions must be considered.
THE PROBLEMS
The growing drug industry in Afghanistan-growing poppies and harvesting the sap, processing the sap into opium paste, morphine and heroin, and transporting the drugs through the country and across its borders-presents numerous challenges for the central Afghan government and Afghan citizens. "Opium cultivation has spread to 28 of the country's 32 provinces, up from 24 in 2002 and 18 in 1999." 12 How well the Afghan government handles these difficulties has strong implications for the future of Afghanistan.
There are economic problems, such as allocation of precious land and labor needed for legitimate agriculture. The largest economic challenge is the diversion of profits from the drug trade that, if it was a legitimate enterprise, would ordinarily circulate throughout the national economic system to benefit all Afghans through economic development, but now benefits only a relatively small and powerful portion of the population. effective money-laundering system and secure transportation to protect shipments." 13 Afghanistan presents a complex political challenge. 14 The population is a collection of various tribes with a long history of conflict and not a strong sense of "nationhood" among them.
The interim Afghan government has struggled against this tribalism in its efforts to establish its authority and move Afghanistan forward as a nation.
Perhaps the greatest problem posed by Afghanistan's opium industry is the link between terrorism and drug money. The administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency, Asa
Hutchinson, in his testimony before Congress in April 1992, stated "The DEA has also received multi-source information that Osama bin Laden himself has been involved in the financing and facilitation of heroin-trafficking activities."
ECONOMIC
Opium production is a growing business in Afghanistan for many reasons. Farmers can earn more money growing opium poppies than by raising legitimate crops and with less effort.
According to United Nations estimates, Afghan farmers can earn about $5,200 from an acre of opium, compared to $121 from an acre of wheat. 16 The Washington Post reports that "Endless fighting destroyed Afghanistan's agricultural infrastructure, in particular the irrigation canals and roads. Poor farmers increasingly turned to opium to support their families. The opium poppy requires less water than wheat, and the valuable sap it produces could be sold quickly to dealers in the fields or kept indefinitely on a shelf and used as barter whenever a family needed something from the local bazaar." 17 Wheat, on the other hand, must be harvested quickly after maturing, moved to the marketplace, and processed or consumed in a relatively short time before the grain spoils. Given Afghanistan's nearly non-existent food processing industry, much of the grain must be milled and consumed locally.
Tribal warlords use the proceeds from poppy production within their area of control to bribe local and provincial officials and to maintain their power base through weapons acquisitions. Similarly, remnants of the Taliban are using their drug profits to acquire weapons and attempt to reestablish power in the southern regions of Afghanistan. They are also reportedly using opium as a means to retaliate against the United States.
The drug industry also reallocates labor from necessary and legitimate work, such as repairing Afghanistan's agricultural and transportation infrastructure. Many workers leave their relatively low-paying reconstruction jobs, lured by the better pay from opium production, drug processing and transportation. The higher wages the drug industry offers drives up the cost of labor throughout the market, increasing government and aid agency costs. Eliminating the drug industry will increase the labor pool and return labor costs to a more sustainable level.
Unfortunately, the profits generated by harvesting the raw opium from poppies, manufacturing the opium into heroin, and smuggling the drug to market bypass the national treasury and do not help Afghanistan as a whole. According to IMF reports, "opium production Committee that control of drugs had taken a back seat to fighting terrorism in the effort to build consensus and alliances. "To build these alliances, unfortunately we've had to make some arrangements, compromises with people who frankly may have some history of involvement with the drug trade and may be even currently protecting the drug trade. This is a tragic situation because given these consensus-building imperatives of the war against terrorism, it is inconceivable that Afghanistan can ever develop as a nation without getting a handle on this opium problem." In the effort to rebuild Afghanistan's infrastructure and institutions, the International Crisis Group (ICG) reminds policy makers that "Afghanistan has not had a strong central government for decades and one is not likely to emerge now. Efforts must be made to build up existing local political structures and support those that can act peacefully and learn to resolve disputes without resorting to weapons." 37 The ICG recognizes the challenge of transitioning Afghanistan's regional militias into a national military, either by eliminating the militias or subordinating them to the central government. "Up to 200,000 soldiers will have to be integrated into a national military structure or demobilized. Military hierarchy will have to be based on law and governmental authority rather than personality and patronage. Military command will have to become responsible to civilian authority and rogue elements reintegrated into society or met with force."
38
The ICG report warns that "Unless there is a serious effort to tackle the drug problem across the region, lawlessness and corruption will continue to be endemic and the threat of a full-blown HIV / AIDS crisis will soon materialize." The report suggests that "most of the aid to the region has gone to boosting interdiction. Much more needs to be done in crop substitution and demand reduction." It recommends that "Anti-drug efforts should be carried out as a key aspect of development and conflict prevention, not solely as a policing action." This means that the causes of poverty leading to drug production and use should be addressed along with drug trafficking. The challenge will be to convince farmers that it is more beneficial for them in the long-term to grow legitimate crops when poppies have proven to be so profitable.
The ICG report suggests that in order for anti-drug efforts to be successful, "officials engaged in anti-drug trafficking should be provided with salaries that will lessen the likelihood of their selling out to drug gangs." The report challenges European countries and European Union to "increase their contribution to combating the drug problem through well coordinated and effective programs that complement existing bilateral and international projects."
39
The IMF's Director for Afghanistan, Adam Bennett, warned that Afghanistan's opium poppies should be destroyed to keep the country from being run by powerful drug traffickers.
"This is a very significant development in Afghanistan and it does carry great dangers for the stability of the country and of the economy." He suggested that "eradicating poppy fields should go hand-in-hand with development of alternative livelihoods for farmers."
40
The National Drug Control Strategy 41 acknowledges the economic drain that opium production has on Afghanistan's development, its contribution to political instability, and the financial assistance that drug profits provide to terrorist organizations. "For these reasons, the United States strongly supports multilateral efforts to reduce the illegal opium and heroin trade that is returning to Afghanistan." The document points out that the United Kingdom is the lead nation for counter narcotics programs in Afghanistan.
The national strategy has two key elements: "disrupting the activities of the most significant drug traffickers through interdiction and law enforcement, and cutting opium production through alternative livelihood initiatives for farmers, coupled with comprehensive eradication efforts." 42 This strategy for Afghanistan complements the overall National Drug Control Strategy of disrupting markets overseas and increasing the costs to the traffickers, making the enterprise less profitable. The US "will bolster the counter narcotics capabilities of the countries bordering Afghanistan to choke off the flow of drugs, precursor chemicals, and related supplies into and out of that nation. Afghan military and law enforcement personnel will be trained and equipped to perform the border and regional security functions that are vital to extending government control to areas without rule of law. Concurrently, near-term efforts will be started to eliminate drug-related corruption from the central and regional governments and the military. The United States will collaborate with the international community and international aid organizations to create opportunities for legitimate economic livelihoods for Afghan farmers and laborers through initiatives that provide micro-credit alternatives and subsistence loans, legal crop substitution options, and cash-for-work programs for migrant workers. Where possible, programs will be focused on projects to redevelop the education, health, public safety, social services, telecommunications, and transportation infrastructure of
Afghanistan."
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RECOMMENDATION
The United States government must use a multi-faceted approach to reconstruct Afghanistan. Social fabric and critical infrastructure must be built and rebuilt. The effort will take years, perhaps a generation, to repair the toll that a generation of civil wars and occupation have taken on the country. Controlling the illegal drug industry will have to be carefully coordinated with the rest of the overall plan. Many competing interests complicate the elimination of Afghanistan's drug problem.
Maloney suggests that policy makers must determine the relationship between opium production and the existing power structures. Are the chieftains involved in growing poppies and producing and trafficking drugs in order to support their operations or is this their operation?
"Like terrorism, drug production tends to gravitate toward and find a base in lawless regions.
Having inflexible, overly moralistic policies for dealing with those who deal in drugs may be unrealistic in this environment if there are other priorities."
44
It is easy to argue that eliminating opium production and trafficking in Afghanistan is necessary to avert a source of income to al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. It is also easy to argue that eliminating opium production and trafficking would improve the political and social conditions in Afghanistan. The challenge is to figure out how to move Afghans away from the drug industry and back to a legitimate source of income. Immediate and complete poppy eradication will not solve the problems, unfortunately, since the social and political upheaval could be more catastrophic than the current situation.
Large-scale opium production in Afghanistan is a relatively recent development, within the last generation. Afghanistan is now the focus of international attention, with the United States, the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization all pledging that "we must not fail in Afghanistan" lest it return to the difficult times it has suffered since the late 1970s. With so much attention on Afghanistan, this may be the time to try bold and imaginative strategies.
First, careful analysis needs to be carried out to trace the trail of money and determine exactly who is profiting from the drug trade-the regional chieftains and residents or the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The United States has been successful in rooting out its organized crime problem through such analysis. Global movements of money, even from or within Afghanistan, should lead to similar success in Afghanistan.
Second, and perhaps the greatest challenge, will be to convince the chieftains to abandon the drug trade. This will be difficult because for some of them, power is the ultimate goal and producing and smuggling opium is a means to maintaining their position. The United States government may be able to use the relationships it created with the provincial leaders while forming the alliance to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda, to explain in unambiguous terms that if
Afghanistan is to grow and thrive as a nation, it is in their best interest and the interest of their people that the marketing of drugs within Afghanistan's borders be abolished. The time to do this is now; there may not be a better time.
The role of the warlords in the future of Afghanistan must be handled carefully. According to Maloney, "a strong central government backed up by the Afghan National Army (ANA) ignores these power brokers. The chieftains are, in fact, the men who control Afghanistan.
They must be part of the solution and made to feel that they are, since it was their people who ultimately bled to take down the Taliban and al-Qaeda alliance. The warlords may view an expansion of the International Security Assistance Force as a precursor force to outright imposition of ANA control, and therefore the central government control. This is a prescription for renewed civil war, something similar to the events of the post-Soviet, pre-Taliban period in the early 1990s, or worse." 45 Third, farmers will have to be weaned from growing opium poppies. Numerous reports indicate that families are benefiting from their poppy harvest and able to afford things-new or larger homes, a car or weapon, or paying off debts-for the first time in a long time.
Unfortunately, these short-term gains may keep them hostage to a hostile industry, and programs that break this dependency on growing illegal crops will benefit the farmers in the long-term. It will be extremely difficult to convince farmers, however, given human nature, that growing crops other than poppy is for their own good.
Repairing or improving the agricultural infrastructure-irrigation systems, storage facilities, transportation networks, markets, and production facilities-might shift the farmers back to growing the crops that used to grow in Afghanistan. The Afghan government already has an assistance program to entice farmers not to grow poppies. The program may be too successful perhaps, as many farmers and even some who are not farmers claim they were growing poppies but now have stopped growing the crop in order to receive the stipend. Better enforcement will help curb the abuse.
Education programs will provide young Afghans with alternative options to farming if there are other sources of income to attract them. In today's global economy, perhaps Afghanistan can become a source of labor for industries as China and India have become. This depends on a stable and secure country and Afghans educated enough to be trained in the skills required by industry.
All of this will depend on a strong Afghan government. It is too soon to tell what will develop after the national elections. Certainly, a relationship will need to be established between the central government and the regional chieftains. Economic and social assistance by the international community will need to continue. An international military presence to provide security is necessary until Afghanistan is able to provide its own. With a stronger
Afghan government, more can be done to establish relationships with its neighbors, including cooperative regional projects such as increased trade of legitimate goods and services and better coordination to stop smuggling of all sorts, but especially drugs.
These measures will have to be applied carefully, and to ensure best success, they should be applied concurrently. Sequencing is important, since it will be impossible for some of the activity, like rebuilding infrastructure, before security is maintained. Can Afghanistan break its habit with opium? Yes, but not on its own. A concerted international effort will help it along the path to recovery.
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